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THE NEW MATH OF SENTENCE CALCULATION AFTER 
FIELDS, WICKES, AND HENDERSON 
by David C. Wright, Stephen Z. Meehan, and Joseph B. Tetrault 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For a long time the General Assembly has 
implemented and relied upon the award of diminution 
credits to prisoners! serving sentences in the State's 
prisons.2 The function of diminution credits is two-fold: 
First, to encourage prisoners to maintain good conduct 
and accept employment at prison jobs. Second, it function 
to alleviate overcrowding by promoting early release of 
nonviolent and non-felony drug offenders. Over the last 
decade the General Assembly has expanded the authority 
and discretion of the Parole Commission to impose 
penalties upon the revocation of mandatory supervision 
release.3 Further complicating matters, over the same 
period, the diminution credit scheme itselfhas undergone 
several amendments and modifications.4 
The changes in the law governing the diminution credit 
scheme resulted in a more complicated sentence calculation 
for the 5, 000 prisoners per year that enter the Maryland 
state prisons, especially for those prisoners with 
consecutive, partially consecutive, or overlapping 
sentences.5 The changes also impacted the sentences of 
prisoners already in the State prison system whose tenns 
of confinement were retrospectively effected by legislation 
or court decisions. 
1 Individuals housed in the State of Maryland Division of Correction 
("DOC") prefer to be referred to as "prisoners," implying they are 
detained against their will, as opposed to "inmates," which they believe 
implies some consent to or acquiescence in their confinement. 
2 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700 (Supp. 1998). 
3 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-612 (1997). 
4 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700 (Since 1970 this section has been 
amended over thirteen times); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-511 (1997) 
(Since its inception this section has been amended at least six times); 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-612 (Since its inception this section has been 
amended over five times). 
5 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700(d}(2)-(3}. 
The executive branch's concern over liability 
compounded by the perceived leniency for the incorrect 
early release of prisoners further complicated the sentence 
calculation. The Division of Correction ("DOC") cured 
the inconsistencies by imposing overly strict interpretations 
of sentence calculation statutes. In some instances the 
DOC even engaged in outright unauthorized bookkeeping 
methods. 
The result was a legal war between prisoners and 
the State waged in and refereed by the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland. The first battle of that war was waged on 
behalfofWayne Hood, Michael Sayko, and Merrill Fields, 
three prisoners who challenged the DOC's unauthorized 
disallowance of street time credits awarded by the 
Maryland Parole Commission and the denial of certain 
good conduct credits.6 On writ of certiorari, the court of 
appeals held that the DOC had misapplied the respective 
statutes. Consolidated under Maryland House of 
Corrections v. Fields,? the decision resulted in the en 
mass release of prisoners who had been imprisoned 
beyond their correct release dates. Fields, Sayko, and 
Hood were followed into the fray by Wayne Wickes, who 
challenged the DOC's application of the 1992 amendments 
creating a two-tiered good conduct credit system.8 
Reported as Beshears v. Wickes,9 the decision adopted 
a short-lived interpretation of Article 27, Section 700 of 
the Maryland Annotated Code which created multiple 
tenns of confinement for calculation purposes. Pursuant 
to that decision, the DOC en mass arrested approximately 
50 prisoners who had been released on mandatory 
supervision, not for violating the tenns of that release, but 
because the State had recalculated and retrospectively 
6 See Maryland House of Corrections v. Fields, 113 Md. App. 136, 
686 A.2d 1103 (1996), aff d, 348 Md. 245, 703 A.2d 167 (1997). 
7Id. 
8 See Beshears v. Wickes, 349 Md. 1,706 A.2d 608 (1998). 
9Id. 
29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 25 
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revised their release dates. One of those arrested was 
Vincent Henderson, who was released on a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City. \0 The State sought certiorari and the court of appeals, 
in Secretary, Dep 't of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servo 
v. Henderson revised the interpretation of Article 27, 
section 700 adopted in Wickes. II The court further held 
that the retroactive recalculation and re-incarceration of 
prisoners on mandatory supervision release was 
improper. 12 
II. RELEVANT CHANGES IN THE LAW PRIOR 
TO THE 1992 LEGISLATION 
Diminution credits for state prisoners in Maryland 
have existed for decades. 13 However, prisoners released 
by the accumulation of credits, as opposed to those 
released by parole, were not under supervision until 1970.14 
Even if a prisoner released on mandatory supervision 
release committed a new offense, that prisoner's 
mandatory supervision release could not be revoked. In 
1970 the General Assembly amended the statute to 
provide, "[a ]ny person sentenced after July 1, 1970, shall, 
upon release, be deemed as if released on parole. "15 The 
amendment further provided the released person was to 
"remain under the supervision of the State Department of 
Parole and Probation until the expiration of the maximum 
term or terms for which he was sentenced. "16 
10 See Secretary, Dep't of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servo V. 
Henderson, 351 Md. 438, 718 A.2d 1150 (1998). 
11 ld. 
12 See id. at 452-53,718 A.2d at 1157-58. 
13 Dimunition credits are earned by the inmates to reduce the length of 
their confinement. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 700 specifies four types of 
dimunition credits: Inmates can earn dimunition credits based upon good 
conduct, "satisfactory performance of work tasks," "satisfactory progress 
in vocational or other educational or training courses," and "satisfactory 
progress in specially selected work projects or other programs." ld. at § 
700( d)-(f) & (h). This paper focuses on good conduct credits, unlike the 
other credits good conduct credits are deducted "in advance from the 
inmate's term of confinement, subject to the inmate's future good 
conduct." ld. at § 700(d)(1). 
14 See 1970 Md. Laws, ch. 406 
151d. 
161d. 
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The statute was amended again in 1989, to permit 
the Parole Commissioner presiding at a revocation hearing 
to, "rescind all diminution credits previously earned on the 
sentence or any portion thereof." I 7 Prisoners sentenced 
after 1970 but before 1989 challenged the retrospective 
application of the amendment on ex post facto grounds. IS 
In Frost V. State, the court rejected the argument, ruling 
that ''the only logical interpretation of the previous statute 
that would accomplish its purpose required a loss of 
diminution credits by operation of law."19 The 1989 
amendment also provided that a person who violated 
mandatory supervision release ("MSR") may not eam any 
new credits on the balance ofthe sentence imposed for 
violating MSR 20 
A. The 1992 Changes 
By 1992, the General Assembly increased the total 
possible credit under Article 27, section 700 to 20 days 
per month.21 The same amendment allowed certain 
prisoners to receive ten good conduct credits per month if 
they had not been convicted of crimes of violence as 
defined in Article 27, section 643B or drug felony 
offenses.22 An uncodified section of the amendment 
provided for prospective application only to a term of 
confinement imposed after October 1, 1992.23 It is the 
17 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 307. 
18 See Frost V. State, 336 Md. 125,647 A.2d 106 (1994). 
191d. at 138, 647 A.2d at 113. 
20 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-612(f); Prisoners and the DOC are 
currently litigating whether this prohibition is directed towards the 
remainder of any mandatory supervision term or extends as well to a 
new sentence. The DOC takes the view that one must "max out" on the 
old sentence before any credits can be applied to the maximum expiration 
date of the new sentence. The prisoners' point of view is that under 
Article 27, section 700, diminution of confinement credits accrue on the 
new sentence from the date of commitment to custody of the 
Commissioner of Correction. Under the Wickes regime the prisoners 
were successful but after Henderson the DOC returned to its prior 
position in this regard. There are as of yet no reported appellate decisions 
on these "max to max" cases. 
21 See 1992 Md. Laws, ch. 588 
22 As defined in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286 (Supp. 1998) 
23 See 1992 Md. Laws, ch. 588, § 2. 
latter amendment that spawned the Fields, Wickes, and 
Henderson cases.24 
B. The Cases 
1. Fields 
The Fields case entailed a consolidated appeal of 
three separate habeas petitions, each seeking immediate 
release based upon diminution credits.25 The court 
considered the following three issues in Maryland House 
of Correction v. Fields:26 
1) Administrative Exhaustion. In contesting a 
sentence calculation, was an inmate required to exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to filing a petition for writ of 
habeas COrpUS?27 
2) Double good conduct credits. Is an inmate 
who is serving both a qualifying and disqualifying sentence 
24 The 1992 changes also caused the DOC to ponder whether certain 
offenses were indeed crimes of violence. In particular, in late 1996 the 
DOC decided that manslaughter by automobile was a crime of violence 
and halved the credits of prisoners convicted of that offense. Some of 
the prisoners were actually awaiting release when the Commissioner of 
Correction, Richard A. Lanham, Sr., in consultation with the Secretary 
of Public Safety, Stuart Simms, and Governor Parris Glendening, made 
the decision to retroactively apply Wickes, causing the arrest of those 
previously released and the retention of those awaiting release. Not 
surprisingly prisoners sought habeas corpus relief. See Sacchet v. Blan, 
120 Md. App. 154,706 A.2d 620 (1998). 
25 See Maryland House of Corrections v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 703 A.2d 
167 (1997). While Fields, Sayko, and Hood were consolidated for 
argument before the Court and opinion by the Court, only Fields raised 
all three issues. Sayko raised only the first two issues and Hood raised 
only the third issue. Accordingly, the joint opinion is generally referred 
to as Fields. 
26 See id. In Hood. Sayko and Wickes. the prisoner plaintiffs were 
represented by the Prisoner Rights Information System of Maryland, 
Inc. (PRISM). In Fields and Henderson. PRISM attorneys filed amicus 
curiae briefs arguing in the interest of the similarly affected prison 
population. In both Fields and Henderson. the amicus curiae position 
carried the day. PRISM is a private legal services corporation designated 
by the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional 
Services to provide legal services to prisoners in the DOC in certain very 
limited areas. In addition to assistance with federal civil rights claims 
resulting from conditions of housing, excessive force, improper medical 
care, and other similar matters, PRISM's representation extends to state 
habeas corpus proceedings based upon improper or illegal sentence 
calculations. 
27 See id. at 249,703 A.2d at 169. 
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entitled to double good conduct credits on the qualifying 
sentence?28 
3) Street time. Upon the Parole Commission 
revoking mandatory supervision release and awarding both 
street time and diminution credits, in calculating the 
prisoner's resulting obligation to the State, may the DOC 
deduct the street time from the diminution credits and only 
apply the remaining diminution credits?29 
a. Administrative Exhaustion 
The DOC has established a lengthy and somewhat 
complicated administrative hearing process to redress 
prisoner grievances.30 This process follows five steps: 
1) Mandatory informal resolution, 
2) Administrative Remedy Procedure to the warden 
("ARP"), 
3) Appeal of Administrative Remedy Procedure to 
the Commissioner of Correction ("AARP"), 
4) Inmate Grievance Office ("I GO") complaint 
before an administrative law judge of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings, and 
2K See id. 
29 See id. 
JIl Despite the requirements of Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 41, 
Section 4- J04(h)(2) (1993 & Supp. 1995), the DOC's administrative 
remedy procedure has never been adopted pursuant to the procedures 
specified for the adoption of regulations in the Administrative Procedure 
Act, Md. Code Ann., State Government Article, § 1 0-1 0 I (1995). Instead, 
it is contained in 28 separate Division of Correction Directives ("DCDs") 
which total 66 pages and have 14 appendices. DCDs 185-00 I through 
185-700 (effective April I, 1993). This requirement was not adopted 
until 1983, after the decision in State v. McCray, 267 Md. 111,297 A.2d 
265 (1972). Moreover, the early versions of the administrative remedy 
procedure were much simpler than the present one. In 1985 it consisted 
ofa mere five pages. Division of Correction Regulation ("DCR") 185-2 
(effective August 5, 1985). Even as late as 1992 the procedure was only 
ten pages long. DCR 185-2 (effective June I, 1987). It was not until 
1993 that it became the huge, unwieldy procedure discussed in the text. 
29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 27 
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5) Mandatory review of any favorable decision by 
the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional 
Services.3) 
31 COMAR 12.07.01.03D requires that the prisoner first exhaust the 
"administrative remedy procedure," before filing a complaint with the 
IGO. This requires that a prisoner must: 
I. File a request for informal resolution of his/her complaint to 
the staff member involved, pursuant to DCD 185-203. 
2. Prison officials have 15 days from the date that they receive 
the request to respond, pursuant to DCD 185-101, §III.A.1. 
3. After receiving the response to the requested informal resolution, 
the prisoner must file a request for Administrative Remedy (ARP) to 
the warden, pursuant to DCD 185-402. 
4. The institution has five working days from the date it receives 
the request to "index" the request, pursuant to DCD 185-101, §III.C.3. 
5. The warden then has 30 days from the date the request is 
indexed to respond and may request an additional 10 days, pursuant to 
DCD 185-101, §III.F. 
6. After receiving the warden's response, the prisoner must file 
an appeal to the Commissioner of Correction (AARP), pursuant to 
DCD 185-403. 
7. The Commissioner's office has five working days from the 
date it receives the appeal to index the appeal, pursuant to DCD 185-
101, §III.H.3. 
8. The Commissioner has 20 days from the date an appeal is 
indexed to respond, pursuant to DCD 185-101, § III.K. 
Once the prisoner receives a response from the Commissioner the 
prisoner is free from the procedural labyrinth which is a prerequisite to 
filing a complaint with the IGO, and he may then finally file such a 
complaint. The IGO procedure, however, is not without its obstacles 
and delays, as it does not provide for an immediate hearing as does the 
habeas corpus procedure, and it does not provide prisoners with the 
ancillary litigation tools, which are consistent with procedural due process. 
The complaint to the IGO is processed as follows: 
I. The IGO has 60 days to perform an initial review to determine 
if the case should be dismissed without a hearing, pursuant to Art. 41, 
§4-1 02.1 (d)( 1997}. 
2. If the complaint is not dismissed, it is referred to the Office of 
the Administrative Hearings. 
3. A prisoner is not allowed to use prehearing discovery. COMAR 
12.07.01.08B. 
4. The prisoner is only permitted to call "such witnesses as the 
[Inmate Grievance] Office or an administrative law judge agrees may 
have relevant testimony to submit and as may be available at reasonable 
times." COMAR 12.07.01.08C(2). 
5. Although hearings are supposed to be held and decisions issued 
"promptly," there are not actual limits in which a hearing must be held or 
a decision issued. 
6. If the administrative law judge who conducts the hearing finds 
the complaint to be meritorious in whole or in part, the decision must be 
sent to the Secretary ofthe Department of Public Safety and Correctional 
Services. 
7. The Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and 
Correctional Services has 15 days to review the decision. MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 41, § 4-102.1. 
29.2 U. BaIt L.F. 28 
The administrative decision is appealed on the record to 
the circuit COurt.32 The total time to complete this process 
may easily exceed six months.33 
In Fields, the DOC contended that the prisoner must 
first exhaust administrative remedies before seeking habeas 
corpus relief.34 Therefore, the DOC argued that the 
principles of administrative law required exhaustion of 
administrative remedies and judicial review prior to seeking 
habeas corpus relief.35 The DOC argued that Fields was 
barred because of his alleged procedural missteps.36 
Fields had pursued his administrative remedies 
through the IGO.37 Believing he was long overdue for 
release, he sought to avoid the delay of the judicial review 
process and seek habeas corpus relief. 38 The DOC 
maintained that Fields was barred from seeking habeas 
corpus relief prior to exhausting the judicial review step, 
even though section 4-102.1 (k) did not address habeas 
corpus proceedings either expressly or implicitly.39 
Additionally, the DOC argued that since Fields had raised 
only the award of double good conduct credits in his 
administrative remedies, and had not raised the street time 
issue administratively, he was barred from raising the street 
time issue by way of a habeas corpus proceeding.40 
32 See MD. RULE 7-201, et seq. 
33 Assuming that the prisoners met all ofthe applicable deadlines, it may 
take 85 days for the prisoner's complaint to reach the IGO. Once the 
prisoner's complaint reaches the IGO, assuming the matter is scheduled 
before an administrative law judge within 30 days as required, it may 
take an additional 105 days for the prisoner to receive a final decision 
from the IGO. 
It should also be noted that after the circuitous detours of the 
administrative process leading to the IGO, and after the IGO process, 
the prisoner's complaint is returned to the Secretary of the Department 
against which the prisoner has filed his complaint. The Secretary then 
has what is effectively veto power over a decision of an administrative 
law judge that may be in the prisoner's favor. 
34 See Fields, 348 Md. at 256, 703 A.2d at 173. 
3S See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 252, 703 A.2d at 171. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. at 259-60, 703 A.2d at 174. 
41l See id. at 256, 703 A.2d at 173. 
The prisoner plaintiffs, in the cases before the court 
in Fields, asserted that the resolution in their favor of the 
. unauthorized taking of street time credits and the failure to 
award statutorily mandated good conduct credits claims 
entitle them to immediate release. Therefore a habeas 
corpus petition was proper.41 The prisoners relied upon 
Earle v. Gunnell42 which held that prior to the prisoner 
fIling a 42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil rights action in state court, 
exhaustion of the remedy provided by the IGO is not 
requiredY The Earle prisoners relied on former Md. 
Rule Z41, 44 which provided that any unlawfully confined 
prisoner may file for habeas corpus relief 45 
The Fields prisoners also put forth Frost v. State46 
and Gluckstern v. Sutton47 to support their position. In 
Frost, the appellant had reached the court by way of a 
habeas corpus proceeding fIled as a challenge to the legality 
of his confinement without first exhausting administrative 
remedies.48 In Gluckstern, the court affirmed the grant 
of habeas corpus relief in the case of a prisoner who 
challenged the retroactive application of statutory 
requirements for parole from the Patuxent Institution 
without first exhausting administrative remedies.49 In both 
cases the court never addressed the exhaustion question, 
but rather proceeded to the substantive issues. While no 
Maryland cases have opined on this specific issue, foreign 
41 See id. 
42 78 Md. App. 648, 554 A.2d 1256 (1989). 
43 See id. at 658,554 A.2d at 1261. 
44 The "z" rules were repealed prior to the Fields decision and are now 
found at Md. Rule 15-301, et seq. 
4l See Earle, 78 Md. App. at 656, 554 A.2d at 1260. 
46 336 Md. 125,647 A.2d 106 (1994). 
46 319 Md. 634, 574 A.2d 898, cert. denied sub nom. Henneberry v. 
Sutton, 498 U.S. 950 (1990). 
48 See Frost, 336 Md. at 130-31,647 A.2d 108-09. 
49 See G1uckstem, 319 Md. 634, 574 A.2d 898. 
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courts which have addressed the question have ruled that 
administrative exhaustion is not a prerequisite to habeas 
corpus relief.50 
Finally, the Fields prisoners argued that the DOC's 
administrative remedy process was insufficient, if not 
illusory. The DOC's administrative system is slow, 
cumbersome, and often leaves prisoners no further relief 
than when they started. The practical reality is that even 
when a prisoner reaches the I GO, the prisoner can expect 
a six month delay before a hearing, that is if the lGO does 
not dismiss the complaint on procedural grounds thus 
requiring judicial review on the dismissal prior to any 
productive review. A system so bogged down is simply 
inadequate to address challenges to the duration of 
confinement when the inmate, if successful, is entitled to 
immediate or near immediate release. The power of the 
Secretary of the Department of Public Safety to have final 
review and veto power makes the process illusory. 
The court determined that, "the usual legal 
presumption is that the administrative remedy is primary 
and must be '''first invoked and followed" before resort 
to the courts. "'51 The court also concluded that, generally, 
prisoners withafOl grievance or complaint against afOl office 
were required to exhaust administrative remedies before 
seeking relief under other common law or statutory 
remedies. 52 However, in the case of prisoners entitled to 
immediate release challenging illegal confinement, there 
was no logical bar to habeas corpus proceedings in the 
administrative scheme. 53 Writing for the Fields Court, 
Judge Chasanowopined: 
lO The purpose of habeas corpus is to allow a restrained person "to have 
a speedy investigation into the cause of his detention and to secure his 
release that takes at least six months unless he is lawfully detained." 
Such a purpose is frustrated if an administrative procedure is a prerequisite 
to habeas corpus relief. Luckie v. State, 502 So.2d 870, 872 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1986). The court must balance the interests of judicial economy 
and administrative efficiency, against the right of the individual to gain 
his freedom at the earliest possible time through a writ of habeas corpus. 
If the court finds the balance tipped in favor of the prisoner, a habeas 
corpus petition will be considered without first exhausting the 
administrative remedies. Barrows v. Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314, 316 
(M.D. Pa. 1974). 
SI Fields, 348 Md. at 258-59, 703 A.2d at 17 4 (quoting Md. Reclamation 
v. Harford Cty. 342 Md. 476, 493, 677 A.2d 567, 576 (1996». 
S2 See id. at 259-60, 703 A.2d at 175. 
S3 See id. at 260,703 A.2d at 174-75. 
29.2 U. Baft. L.F. 29 
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If a habeas corpus proceeding, by an 
inmate asserting an entitlement to immediate 
release, were nothing more than a common-
law or statutory remedy, we would agree with 
the Division that the inmate would be required 
first to invoke and exhaust the administrative 
procedure. 
A habeas corpus proceeding, however, 
is not simply a common-law or statutory remedy 
over which the General Assembly has full 
controL Instead, it is a remedy authorized and 
protected by the Constitution of Maryland. 
MD. CONST. Art. III, §55 provides that "[t]1)e 
General Assembly shall pass no Law 
suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus." While the legislature may 
"reasonably" regulate the issuance of the writ, 
any legislatively imposed regulations must not 
impair the fundamental right to the substantive 
remedy of habeas corpus. 54 
b. Double Good Conduct Credits for Post-October 
1, 1992 Offenders. 
The determination of this issue hinges on the 
interpretation and application of''term of confinement" as 
that term is used in the 1992 amendment to Article 27, 
section 700,55 which implemented a dual system of good 
conduct credits for qualifying and disqualifying sentences.56 
54Id. at 260;703 A.2d at 174-75 (citing OIewilerv. Brady, 185 Md. 341, 
346,44 A.2d 807, 809 (1945); State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 572 (1880)). 
55 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700(a). 
In this section, "term of confinement" means: 
(I) The length of the sentence for a single sentence; or 
(2) The period from the first day of the sentence beginning 
first through the last day ofthe sentence ending last for: 
(i) Concurrent sentences; 
(ii) Partially concurrent sentences; 
(iii) Consecutive sentences; or 
(iv) A combination of concurrent and consecutive sentences. 
56 See Fields, 348 Md. at 263,708 A.2d at 176. Specifically the operative 
language of Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700(d) stated: 
(I) An inmate shall be allowed a deduction in advance from 
the inmate's term of confinement, subject to the inmate's 
future good conduct. 
29.2 U. Bait L.F. 30 
Those prisoners serving qualified sentences imposed after 
1992 receive double good conduct credits of 1 0 days per 
month, while prisoners serving disqualifying sentences 
received only 5 days per month. 57 All offenders sentenced 
prior to 1992 received credit at the old rate. Due to the 
1992 amendment to Article 27, section 700, the legislature 
created the possibility that a prisoner could owe an 
obligation to the State consisting of two separate sentences, 
one of which was for a qualifying offense for which sentence 
was imposed after 1992, and one of which was for a 
disqualifying offense, or a pre-1992 sentence. 58 
The DOC contended that "term of confinement" 
included the entire obligation to the State and that if any 
portion of that obligation was for a disqualifying offense 
. or a pre-1992 sentence, the prisoner was disqualified from 
receiving double good conduct credits on the entire 
obligation to the State. 59 The prisoners took the position 
that a period of incarceration consisting of multiple 
sentences imposed at different times cannot be considered 
to have been imposed at any single definite point in time 
and is therefore not a single term of confinement, at least 
on the good conduct issue.60 In point of fact, the prisoners 
contended that with the potential for additional sentences, 
a term of confinement can never be said to have been fully 
imposed until it has been fully served.61 
(2) For an inmate whose term of confinement includes 
a consecutive or concurrent sentence for either a crime of 
violence as defined in Article 27, §643B of the Code or a 
crime of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or 
possessing a controlled dangerous substance as provided 
under Article 27, §286 ofthe Code, this deduction shall be 
calculated at the rate of 5 days for each calendar month, 
and on a prorated basis for any portion of a calendar month, 
from the first day of commitment to the custody of the 
Commissioner through the last day of the inmate's 
maximum term of confinement. 
(3) For all other inmates, this deduction shall be 
calculated at the rate of 10 days for each calendar month, 
and on a prorated basis for any portion of a calendar month, 
from the first day of commitment to the custody of the 
Commissioner through the last day of the inmate's 
maximum term of confinement. 
57 See 1997 Md. Laws, ch. 588. 
58 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700(a). 
59 See Fields, 348 Md. at 263, 703 A.2d at 176. 
6() See id. at 265-66, 703 A.2d at 177. 
61 See id. at 266-67, 703 A.2d at 178. 
The court ruled that while the definition of "term of 
confinement" as set forth in Article 27, section 700, 
included a prisoner's total obligation to the State, the clarity 
of that definition does not '''preclud[e] [the court] from 
looking at the purpose of the statute. '''62 The court noted 
that the legislative history behind the implementation of 
double good conduct credits was to reduce prison 
overcrowding.63 Based upon the legislative history, the 
court concluded that a prisoner's obligation to the State 
could be comprised of more than one term of confinement 
with the application of good conduct credits for qualifying 
nonviolent sentences and disqualifying or pre-1992 
sentences as the statute provided.64 The court explained 
that 
[t]he effect of this decision is that, for those 
sentences imposed before October 1, 1992, 
good conduct credits should be awarded at the 
old rate of five days per month. Those 
nonviolent, non-drug related sentences imposed 
during a new sentencing after October I, 1992 
should carry good conduct credits at the rate 
often per month.65 
c. Street Time 
When a prisoner's time in custody and the prisoner's 
total diminution credits equals the total sentence and the 
prisoner has not previously been released on parole, the 
prisoner is released to mandatory supervision for a period 
equal to his diminution credits.66 Upon violation, the 
prisoner appears before a parole commissioner for a 
revocation hearing.67 Where the parole commissioner finds 
that the prisoner has violated the mandatory supervision 
release, the prisoner is required to serve the balance of 
the sentence - time equal to the number of diminution 
62 Fields, 348 Md. at 263,703 A.2d at 176 (qouting State v. Thompson, 
332 Md. 1, 7, 629 A.2d 731, 734 (1993». 
63 See id. 
64 See id. at 267-68, 703 A.2d at 178. 
6\ ld. at 268, 703 A.2d at 178. 
66 See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-612 (1997). 
67 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-511 (a) (1997). 
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credits used to secure mandatory release.68 At this point, 
the parole commissioner has the discretion to reduce the 
time remaining on the sentence by crediting all or part of 
the days spent out on supervision69 and allow the prisoner 
to retain all, some, or none of the diminution credits the 
prisoner had earned and used to secure mandatory 
supervision release.70 
Notwithstanding the statutory provision, the DOC 
took the position that street time credit and diminution 
credits could not both be applied to the balance of the 
sentence to be served.71 The DOC's ultimate concern 
was that in a case where a prisoner was awarded all of 
the street time and all of the diminution credits, the Parole 
Commission could effectively terminate any return to 
custody and return the prisoner to the street. 72 The DOC 
argued that the institutional commitment offices were 
required to deduct the street time credit awarded by a 
parole commissioner from the good conduct credits 
awarded by the Parole Commissioner and the net result 
was applied against the balance of the time the prisoner 
had to serve.73 The DOC argued that it was not exercising 
any discretionary authority, but was merely carrying out 
the Parole Commission's decision and cited its own internal 
68 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-511(c). 
69 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-511 provides in part: "[I]fthe order of 
parole is revoked, the prisoner shall serve the remainder ofthe sentence 
originally imposed unless the Commission member hearing the parole 
revocation, in the member's discretion, grants credit for time between 
release on parole and revocation of parole." 
70 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-612 (1988) provides in part: "The Parole 
Commissioner presiding may rescind all diminution credits previously 
earned on the sentence or any portion thereof in the revocation 
proceedings. " 
68 See Fields, 348 Md. at 269, 703 A.2d at 179. 
12 The DOC maintained this position despite the fact that the controlling 
legislation did not prohibit such a result. Logically, however, such a 
result would be unlikely in that if the Commissioner sought to achieve 
such an end result, the means would very likely have been simply a 
decision not to violate MSR. 
7J See Fields, 348 Md. at 268-69, 703 A.2d at 179. 
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regulations, the Commitment Procedures Manual, as 
authority for its position.74 To this day, those regulations 
have never met the scrutiny of the legislature and are not 
reliable authority. 7S 
The prisoners set forth a three-prong attack on the 
DOC's form of cipher. 76 First, the Parole Commission 
was perfectly within its authority to grant sufficient street 
time and good conduct credits to effectively vacate the 
balance of the sentence.77 Second, it is the Parole 
Commission and not the DOC which has the sole authority 
to rescind good conduct credits following revocation at 
mandatory supervision.78 Third, if street time and good 
conduct credits are both designed to reduce a prisoner's 
sentence, it is illogical and illegal to deduct one from the 
other for sole purpose of making a prisoner serve more 
tim 79 e. 
The respective DOC's and prisoners' approaches 
may be demonstrated as follows: 
74 See id. at 269, 703 A.2d at 179. 
75 Under the DOC's approach, upon retake if a prisoner was awarded a 
larger amount of street time than good conduct credits, it is possible to 
be returned to prison with more of an obligation to the State for the same 
sentence than when the prisoner was released on mandatory supervision. 
76 See Amicus curiae brief for PRISM, Fields (No. 125-1996). 
77 See Fields, 348 Md. at 271,706 A.2d at 180. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. at 269-70, 706 A.2d 179. 
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Prisoners' Approach DOC's Approach 
Detennining Initial Maximum Expiration Date ("MED''): 
Imposition: 1/1190 Imposition: 111190 
Tenn: 7yrs. Tenn: 7yrs. 
Current MED: 111197 CurrentMED: 111197 
MSRdate: 9/22/94 MSRdate: 9/22/94 
Returned: 6/25/96 Returned: 6/25/96 
Days Out: 641 Days Out: 641 
Street Time: <641> Street Time: <641> 
-0- -0-
Adj.MED: 111197 Adj.MED: 111197 
New New 
Imposition: 12/31196 Imposition: 12/31196 
Tenn: 5yrs. Tenn: 5 yrs. 
NewMED: 12/31101 NewMED: 12/31101 












MSR Date: 12/31/01 
less 731 days =12/30/99 
Old GCC: 831 
MPC Street: <641> 
subtotal: 190 
. MPCResc.: <401> 
Illusory subtotal: -0-
New GCC.: 300 
GCCBal: 300 
MSR Date: 12/31/99 
less 300 days = 3/6/01 
After setting forth this dual sentence calculation in 
their amicus curiae brief in Fields,80 the prisoners 
demonstrate the illogic of the DOC's stance. The confusion 
of the "illusory subtotal," implies the DOC has an unwritten 
8(1 See id. 
rule "which magnanimously requires that the prisoner not 
be given a negative diminution credit balance which would 
require the prisoner to serve time to offset that negative 
balance before he may actually begin serving his 
sentence."81 The brief asserts there is a severe flaw in an 
accounting system which must include in its procedure a 
built in adjustment to avoid results which are logically 
dictated to be incorrect. 82 The brief concl udes that the 
mere fact that such an illogical result must be avoided by 
an exception to the stated procedure is evidence that the 
procedure itself is defective. 83 
The amicus brief further illustrates the effect of the 
DOC's dubious procedure.84 The Parole Commission 
gives "street time" which is accounted for in the adjusted 
maximum expiration date.85 The DOC then takes away 
that "street time" by deducting it from the prisoners 
diminution credits. It is unclear, as the brief states, the 
source from which the DOC derives its authority to 
subtract the "street time" credit from the diminution 
credits. 86 
The brief notes the Parole Commission derives its 
authority from two separate statutes enacted by the 
Maryland General Assembly.87 Moreover, the brief 
asserts, the logical intent of those statutes support Parole 
Commission's position.88 The DOC's basis of support is 
its own Commitment Procedures Manual which was 
adopted without any prior public dissemination or 
opportunity for public comment and is subject only to the 
delegable approval authority of the Commissioner of 
Correction.89 Further illustrating the illogic of the system, 
81 Amicus curiae brieffor PRISM at 30, Fields (No. 125-1996). 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
8S See id. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
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the computer system used is acknowledged by the DOC, 
''to be incapable of correctly calculating sentences. ''90 
The court agreed with the prisoners' position. The 
DOC's interpretation of street time credits was found to 
be "especially illogical" in light of the statute.91 Article 41, 
section 4-511(d)(I), provides that upon revocation of 
mandatory supervision release, the prisoner shall serve the 
remainder of the sentence originally imposed, unless the 
Maryland Parole Commission, in its discretion, grants credit 
for the time between release on mandatory supervision 
and revocation of that mandatory supervision.92 The 
language of subsection (d)(I) provides that the prisoner 
must serve the balance of the originally imposed sentence, 
unless the Parole Commission grants street time credit. 93 
The court concluded that the DOC was without 
authority to adjust the award of diminution credits given 
by the Parole Commission.94 That authority rests solely 
within the discretion of the Parole Commission.95 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the DOC 
improperly adjusted prisoner's diminution credits by the 
amount of street time credit awarded the prisoners by the 
Parole Commission. 96 
2. Wickes 
Beshears v. Wickes97 was the first test case of the 
DOC's interpretation of Fields. Fields raised the more 
general question about the appropriate application of the 
October 1, 1992 amendment to post-amendment violators 
with nonviolent offenses. Wayne Wickes challenged the 
90 Id. (quoting Petitioner's (Division's) Brief at n.6, Fields (No. 125-
1996). 
91 See Fields, 348 Md. at 269, 706 A.2d at 179. 
92 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-511. 
93 See id. (Subsection (d)(2) creates an exception to that exception which 
prohibits the Parole Commission from granting street time credit to 
those prisoners whose mandatory supervision was revoked as a result 
of violent crime. The Court of Appeals implied that exception to the 
exception substantiated the statutory authority for use of the exception.) 
94 See Fields, 348 Md. at 271,706 A.2d at 180. 
9S See id. 
% See id. at 271-72,706 A.2d at 180. 
97 349 Md. 1, 706 A.2d 608 (1998). 
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DOC's application of the good conduct credit amendment 
to a prisoner who was serving sentences for both a pre-
amendment violent crime and a post-amendment 
nonviolent crime.98 Confronted with that factual scenario, 
the DOC concluded that the pre-amendment sentence for 
a violent crime tainted the post-amendment sentence for a 
nonviolent crime for the purposes of awarding double good 
conduct. 99 Wickes argued that such an interpretation was 
an incorrect reading of both the statute and the Fields 
decision. 100 
On a petition for habeas corpus, the trial court agreed 
with Wickes and ordered that the DOC apply good 
conduct credits at the rate of 1 0 per month to the sentence 
for the post-amendment nonviolent crime. 101 The DOC 
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
but the Court of Appeals of Maryland, sua sponte, issued 
a writ of certiorari to decide the question. 102 The court 
affirmed the trial COurt,103 but included dicta that resulted 
in the creation of multiple terms of confinement for each 
individual sentencing event where there was a break in 
custody from the DOC. 
Applying the Fields decision to Wickes' case, Judge 
Chasanow, writing for the court, concluded that "the 
sentencing of a defendant for a subsequent offense while 
he is out on mandatory supervision release for a prior 
offense is a separate sentencing event:'I04 As such, the 
court stated that "Wickes's sentences for the violent 
offense of rape and the nonviolent offense of third-degree 
burglary [were] part of two separate sentencing events 
and, therefore, are to be deemed separate terms of 
confinement."IOS 
98 See Wickes, 349 Md. at 5, 706 A.2d at 610. 
99 See id. at 4, 706 A.2d at 609. 
100 See id. at 5,706 A.2d at 610. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. at 3, 706 A.2d 609. 
104 Id. at 11, 706 A.2d at 613. 
IO~ Id. at 12, 706 A.2d 613. 
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As innocuous and possessed of a priori logic as that 
statement may seem, the DOC relied upon this dicta in 
Wickes as a basis to recalculate sentences for those 
prisoners who were serving or had served partial 
concurrent, partial consecutive, qualifying and disqualifying 
sentences. 106 The result was that numerous prisoners were 
"Wickes'ed."107 This meant the DOC applied Wickes 
106 The operative language, defined by the prisoners as dicta, was not so 
defined by the DOC or the minority of the Court in Henderson, 351 
Md. 438, 718 A.2d 1150 (1998). That language was as follows: "Finally, 
we reiterate our rejection ofthe Division's argument, posited in Fields, 
that to calculate separate rates for separate terms of confinement being 
served consecutively 'would be difficult to administer.'" Wickes, 349 
Md. at 10,706 A.2d at 612 (quoting Fields, 348 Md. at 265, 703 A.2d 
at 177). However, an illustration shows that the calculations are not that 
complicated. 
An inmate may have two different mandatory release dates 
just as the inmate may serve concurrent sentences of 
different lengths. For example, an inmate is serving 
concurrent overlapping sentences A and B. Sentence A is 
a ten-year sentence for a crime of violence imposed on 
January 1, 2000. The inmate is released on mandatory 
supervision 600 days early (10 years x 5 credits/month x 
12 months/year = 600 good conduct credits. While out on 
mandatory supervision release the inmate receives sentence 
B, a ten-year sentence for a nonviolent, non-drug related 
offense imposed on January 1, 2009, which would terminate 
on January 1, 2019 without the application of any good 
conduct credits. Because this subsequent offense violates 
the conditions of the inmate's mandatory release, his 
mandatory supervision release is revoked and he must now 
serve the 600 days remaining on sentence A, which he also 
began serving on January 1, 2009. Thus, the inmate's 
mandatory release date with respect to sentence A will be 
August of20 1 O. Unless the inmate's B sentence is reversed, 
however, the inmate will not actually be released in August 
of20 1 0 because with regard to sentence B, the inmate will 
not be eligible for mandatory supervision release until 
September of 2015 (more than 3 years early through the 
application of good conduct credits at a rate of ten days 
per month - 10 years x 10 credits/month x 12 months/year 
= 1200 good-conduct credits). In other words, even though 
these sentences overlap, the inmate will have two different 
mandatory release dates. Similarly, if sentence B were for 
one year, the mandatory supervision release date would be 
August of 20 1 0, instead of September of2009. Moreover, 
as we said in Fields, "[w]e should not adopt the Division's 
theory merely because to do otherwise would saddle the 
Division with more complex calculations." Id. at 10-11, 
206 A.2d at 603 (quoting Fields, 348 Md. at 265, 703 A.2d 
at 177). 
107 At argument before the court of appeals in Henderson, upon 
questioning from the court, counsel for the Secretary indicated very few 
prisoners were effected, less than 100 prisoners. When asked by the 
court, counsel for the prisoners reported that the DOC's house counsel 
retrospectively to prisoners' sentence calculation and thus 
moved mandatory release dates further into the future or 
issued administrative escape retake warrants to return 
prisoners who, on recalculation, were released too 
early. lOS 
a. History behind Wickes 
To understand the nuances of the DOC's 
interpretation of the dicta in Wickes, one must participate 
in a history lesson in sentence calculation and return to the 
line graphs of our adolescence.109 Prior to 1990 and the 
codification ofDCIB 9-90 by amendment to the provisions 
of Article 27, section 700,110 the DOC operated under a 
advised that 2000 prisoners were effected. Counsel for the Secretary 
was forced to acknowledge the accuracy of the prisoners' head count. 
108 See generally Wickes, 349 Md. I, 706 A.2d 608. The Wickes decision 
did not reach the issue of street time credit for the time the DOC said 
these prisoners were wrongfully released. However, logic certainly 
supports the contention that an erroneous release on mandatory 
supervision subject to the same terms and conditions as if one were on 
parole, is in effect a parole, or, at the very least, that such a prisoner is 
entitled to street time credit for that period during which he was on 
mandatory supervision release without violation of its condition. 
109 Much of this history and the illustrative graphs are directly from the 
prisoners' brief in Henderson. 
110 DCIB No. 9-90, dated March 9, 1990, SUBJECT: A WARDING 
DIMINUTION OF CONFINEMENT CREDIT FOR INMATES 
WITH OVERLAPPING CONCURRENT SENTENCES 
I. Secretary Bishop L. Robinson has now received advice 
by memorandum from Attorney General J. Joseph Curran 
on the application of diminution credits to overlapping 
concurrent sentences. Overlapping concurrent sentences 
are those which: 
a. have a starting date which falls between the inmate's 
then current starting and maximum expiration dates; and 
b. cause a new maximum expiration date which falls 
beyond the current maximum expiration date. 
2. Attorney General Curran's memorandum advises that 
credits earned under Article 27, section 700 between the 
first day of commitment and the maximum expiration date 
are to be applied to the maximum expiration date. Section 
704A credits, it follows, are to be applied in the same 
manner. This means that credits ordinarily will not be 
attributed only to specific sentences, but instead to whole 
terms of incarceration. Specific circumstances may require 
exceptions to this, and they will be reviewed and dealt 
with as they arise. 
Articles 
sentence calculation system which provided for cell parole 
for partially concurrent, partially consecutive "overlapping" 
sentences. An "overlapping consecutive/concurrent" 
obligation to the DOC may be graphically illustrated as 
follows: 
3. A hypothetical case will illustrate the principles set out· 
in this policy: 
If inmate Jones has a three year sentence beginning 
January I, 1990, and receives a second three year sentence 
beginning on January I, 1991, his maximum expiration date 
will be January I, 1994. Good conduct days attributable 
to the four year term (assuming full good conduct credits, 
240 days) will be applied to this maximum expiration date. 
Additionally, all industrial, educational, and special project 
credits earned from January 1, 1990 will be applied to this 
maximum expiration date. 
4. This method of applying diminution credits will be 
implemented immediately by all commitment offices, and 
will be applied to all new transactions occurring after the 
date ofthis DCIB. Additionally, the DOC will, as soon as 
reasonably possible, recalculate all sentences of this nature 
which have not been calculated in accordance with the above 
method. The review of existing sentences will be under the 
supervision of the commitment supervisor for each 
institution, who shaH: 
a. ensure that first the sentences of all inmates scheduled 
for release on mandatory supervision (those in the "short 
file") are reviewed and recalculated under the policy set 
out in this DCIB, if necessary; 
b. ensure that the sentences of all inmates identified on 
a computer list generated from OBSCIS and provided by 
DOC HQ are reviewed and recalculated under this DCIB, 
if necessary; 
c. ensure that specific claims of overlapping concurrent 
sentences by or on behalf of inmates are reviewed to assure 
that the sentences are calculated consistent with this DCIB; 
and 
d. ensure that the sentences of all inmates returned to 
custody from escape, parole, mandatory supervision, or 
other out-of-custody status are reviewed, and to the extent 
necessary, recalculated under this DCIB. 
5. In the event there are any questions about this procedure, 
or concerns about possible exceptions to the procedure, 
they should be referred to Warren Sparrow, Chief of 
Classification. 
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Start Date Expiration Date 





Often, such an "overlapping consecutive/concurrent" 
sentence is caused by a break in custody due to a release 
on parole or mandatory supervision from an original 
sentence, followed by a new sentence and subsequent 
revocation of parole or mandatory supervision on the 
original sentence. Such an "overlapping consecutive/ 
concurrent" sentence may be graphically illustrated as 
follows: 




____ I 1 _____ _ 
Start Date Parole 




Start Date Expiration 




Prior to 1990, the DOC applied diminution of 
confinement credits to individual sentences so that a 
prisoner with an "overlapping consecutive/concurrent" 
sentence would be "released" to "cell parole" on sentence 
B, but would remain to complete service of sentence A. 
That may be graphically illustrated as follows: 
III For the purpose of consistency, if not logic, in sentence illustrations 
and hypotheticals, the author has used the DOC's sentence identification 
style of identifying the first sentence as Sentence "B" for "Before" and 
the second sentence as Sentence "A" for "After." (The author is unable 
to attribute the praise for this bit of nomenclature to any individual in 
the DOC, so the DOC as a whole is the recipient of such praise.) 
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Period of Cell Parole 
--_____ -1 _________ 1 
Start Date 
SentenceB 





Maximum Expiration Date 
Sentence A 
In response to prisoner litigation, the DOC 
reevaluated its practices in regard to "overlapping 
consecutive/concurrent" sentences and "cell parole" and 
on March 6, 1990, issued Division of Correction 
Information Bulletin ("DCIB") 9-90, which directed the 
DOC's commitment clerks to apply diminution of 
confinement credits to the maximum expiration date farthest 
in the future. DCIB 9-90 abolished the practice of "cell 
parole" and inmates received the benefit of all diminution 
of confinement credits awarded or earned while in prison. 
Subsequent to the abolishment of "cell parole," inmates 
no longer lost the benefit of diminution credits earned on 
the earlier sentence and received earlier mandatory 
supervision release dates and earlier releases from 
incarceration. However, the DOC still maintained the view 
that a combination of sentences for eligible and ineligible 
offenses in an "overlapping consecutive/concurrent" 
sentence structure rendered the prisoner completely 
ineligible for special project diminution credits for the entire 
period of incarceration. 
Pursuant to Article 41, section 4-612( f), the DOC 
determined that a prisoner could not earn any diminution 
of confinement credits on a subsequent "overlapping 
consecutive/concurrent" sentence until the prisoner reached 
the maximum expiration date ofthe prior revocation of 
mandatory release sentence. 112 These cases became 
known as "max to max" cases, as good conduct credit on 
the subsequent sentence was only awarded from the 
maximum expiration date of the prior sentence to the 
maximum expiration date of the subsequent sentence, rather 
112 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-612(0 provides: "A person under 
mandatory supervision may not earn any new diminution credits once 
the mandatory supervision has been revoked." 
than from the date of commitment on the subsequent 
sentence to the maximum expimtion date of that subsequent 
sentence. This may be illustrated as follows: 
Period of Parol elM and. Maximum Expimtion 
Supervision Date 
1 1 ______ -' __ 1 
Post 7/1189 Sentence B Sent B 1 
Sentence B ParolelMand. Retake 1 





Start Date Release Date 
for earning Sentence A 
diminution 
credits 
Consider the following example. 113 On January 1, 
1980, John Doe is committed to the custody of the 
Commissioner of Correct ion for a sentence of five years. 
F or the sake of simplicity, let us eliminate pretrial credit 
under Article 27, section 638C, and posit that the sentence 
also commences on January 1, 1980. The maximum 
expiration date is therefore January 1, 1985. OnJanuary 
1, 1981, Doe is again committed to the custody of the 
Commissioner of Correction for a sentence of five years, 
commencing January 1, 1981. The new maximum 
expimtion date is now January 1, 1986. The total obligation 
to the DOC is six years. The sentence structure may be 
graphically illustrated as follows: 
113 The following assumptions apply to this hypothetical: (1) all four 
convictions are for the same offense; (2) there are no forfeitures for 
violating prison disciplinary rules (See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700(g)); 
(3) neither prisoner makes parole; (4) each prisoner gets 120 diminution 
of confinement credits per year of incarceration (60 good conduct credit 
and 60 industrial credits with the good conduct credits given in a "lump 
sum" at entry into the DOC and the industrial credits being earned on a 
month by month basis at a rate of five days per month of incarceration). 
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1 __________ 1 
111180 111185 
Start Date Maximum Expiration Date 
Sentence B Sentence B 
1 ___________ 1 
111181 111186 
Start Date Maximum Expiration Date 
Sentence A Sentence A 
On January 1, 1980, Mike Roe is committed to the 
custody of the Commissioner of Correction for a sentence 
offiveyears,commencingJanuary 1, 1980. OnJanuary 
1, 1981, Roe is sentenced to one year, to be served 
consecutively. Roe's maximum expimtion date is January 
1, 1986. Roe's total obligation is six years. The sentence 
structure may be graphically illustrated as follows: 
1_----1-1 ___ ~I 
111180 111/85 111/86 
Start Date End Date Sent. B Maximum Expiration 
Sentence B Start Date Sent. A Date 
Both Sentences 
Based upon the preceding hypothetical, prior to 
March 6, 1990, the official effective date ofDCIB 9-90, 
Doe's and Roe's sentences could have been calculated as 
follows: 
(1) Roe would have been released to mandatory 
supervision on or about April 22, 1984, having received 
the benefit of360 good conduct credits and approximately 
259 industrial credits; 
(2) Doe would have been "released" to "cell parole" 
on his "B" sentence on or about August 4, 1983, having 
been awarded 300 good conduct credits on that sentence 
and having earned approximately 216 industrial credits; 
(3) Doe would have remained incarcerated to 
complete the service of the "A" sentence and would not 
have actually been released from incarceration until on or 
about December 15, 1984. At this point he has been 
awarded 300 good conduct credits on his second sentence 
but has only received the benefit of 82 industrial credits 
earned between the date of his "cell parole" and his actual 
mandatory supervision release date. 
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Let us assume that prior to April 22, 1984, under 
the hypothetical set forth above, Doe and Roe shared the 
same cell and worked side-by-side in the same prison 
kitchen for their five industrial credits per month. On April 
22, 1984, Doe sees his cell mate, who was convicted of 
the same offenses and received the same time to serve, go 
home, while Doe stays in prison for another eight months. 
As a result of that inequity, prisoners in Doe's situation 
filed suit and sought relief. In response to these cases, the 
DOC promulgated DCIB 9-90, which officially became 
effective on March 6, 1990. For the first time, DOC 
commitment staff were directed to apply diminution credits 
against the entire term of confinement. At the request of 
the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 
the General Assembly subsequently amended Article 27, 
section 700, to add a definition of "term of confinement" 
that comported with the application of credits called for 
by DCIB 9-90. 114 
The legislative history of the 1991 amendmentto 
Article 27, section 700 shows that the DOC's current view 
of sentences is that of separate terms of confmement for 
the purpose of applying the benefit of diminution credits. I 15 
This view is contrary to the intent of the General Assembly 
and is violative of the guarantee of equal protection of the 
laws. The amendment originated as House Bill 174.116 
The Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services 
filed a bill entitled "Position on Proposed Legislation. "117 
That document reads that the amendment in question, 
concerning the definition of "term of confinement,"118 
would: 
114 See 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 354. 
liS See id. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
118 Prior to July I, 1991, the effective date of the amendment, MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 27, §700, provided for deductions, " ... within the period between 
the first day of commitment to the custody of the Commissioner and the 
last day of the inmate's maximum term of confinement," but did not 
define, "term of confinement." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700 (1987 
Repl. Vol.). 
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[m lake it clear, consistent with Division [of 
Correction] practice and view of current law 
[i.e., the view contained in DCIB 9-90], that 
diminution of confinement credits are applied 
across the entire term of confinement an inmate 
is serving, as opposed to being applied to the 
individual sentences that make up thattenn. The 
result is that an inmate with a combination 
of consecutive and concurrent sentences is 
awarded good conduct credits in the same 
manner as an inmate who must serve the 
same amount of time, but based upon a 
single sentence. This is consistent with the 
manner in which the Maryland Parole 
Commission, under law, treats the sentences 
to which an inmate is subject when parole is 
granted. 119 
In the wake of Wickes, the DOC returned to "cell 
parole" for those prisoners with sentences separated by a 
break in custody as a result of reincarceration after release 
to either mandatory supervision or parole. 120 It should be 
noted that the amendment to Article 27, section 700, was 
as a result of the DOC's request to codify DCIB 9-90, 
and that the DOC was interpreting that amendment to 
Article 27, section 700, in such a way as to recreate the 
equal protection problem DCIB 9-90 was designed to 
cure. The equal protection problems presented by the 
DOC's approach may be illustrated by another 
hypothetical. 
119 1991 Md. Laws,ch. 354 (emphasis added). A review of the H.B. 174 
file reveals that the particular amendment to the definition of term of 
confinement was approved with little or no controversy. It appears that 
another amendment that took effect in 1991 and prohibited the award of 
diminution of confinement credits to prisoners serving Maryland 
sentences in foreign jurisdictions occupied more committee attention 
and comment from both the Legal Aid Bureau and the Office of the 
Attorney General. 
12U Wnile the breaks in custody in both Fields and Wickes were caused by 
mandatory supervision releases, there appears to be no logical distinction 
between parole and release to mandatory supervision under these 
circumstances. It is unknown in its post-Wickes calculations how the 
DOC would treat a break in confinement due to an escape. 
On January 1, 1990, John Doe is sentenced to ten 
years in the DOC, commencing on January 1, 1990, with 
a maximum expiration date of January 1,2000. Doe is 
granted parole effective on January 1, 1995. Doe remains 
free from DOC custody for two years. On January 1, 
1997, Doe receives a sentence of ten years, commencing 
January 1, 1997, running concurrent with the prior sentence 
and resulting in an adjusted maximum expiration date of 
January 1, 2007 for Sentence A. Parole is revoked. He 
owes the DOC two years for time out of custody. Doe is 
allowed one year credit for "street" time. 121 He owes the 
DOC one year, which is added to the end of his first 
sentence, but which does not affect his maximum expiration 
date to give him an adjusted maximum expiration date of 
January 1,2001 for Sentence B. Doe'sobligationmay 
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On January 1, 1990, Jane Roe is sentenced to ten 
years in the DOC, to commence on January 1, 1990, with 
a maximum expiration date of January 1, 2000. Roe is 
granted parole effective on January 1, 1995, and is free 
from DOC custody for two years. Parole is revoked on 
December 1, 1997, and Roe is allowed one year "street" 
time. Roe owes the DOC one year which is added to the 
121 See MD. ANN CODE art. 41, § 4-511(d)(1). 
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end of that sentence to give Roe an adjusted maximum 
expirationdateofJanuary 1,2001. On January 1, 1997, 
Roe is sentenced to six years in the DOC, to be served 
consecutively to the parole violator sentence. 122 Roe's 
obligation is graphically illustrated as follows: 
Period of Release 
on Parole 
1-1 _____ 1 1 1 
1/1/90 1/1/95 1/1/97 1/1/01 1/1/07 
Start Parole Parole Adjusted Maximum 
Date Date Retake Maximun Expiration 
Sent B SentB Original Expiration Date 
Date Date Sentence B 
Sentence B 
The total obligation to the DOC in both cases is 
exactly the same. However, in the post-Wickes world of 
diminution of confinement credits, at least in the DOC's 
view of that world, Roe receives the benefit of all credits 
awarded or earned during the entire period of 
incarceration, while Doe will have to "mandatory out" on 
the balance of Sentence B and then start allover again on 
the Sentence A.123 Again, assuming credit at a rate of 
120 days per year (60 days per year for good conduct 
credit awarded in a lump sum at the start of each 
incarceration and five days a month industrial credits 
earned and applied on a month to month basis) and no 
forfeitures of good conduct credit for violating prison 
disciplinary rules, Doe will be released to mandatory 
supervision on or about May 14,2004, while Roe will be 
released to mandatory supervision on or about September 
24, 2002, a difference of roughly 20 months. 
122 Under the DOC's interpretation of MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 690C 
(1996), parole must first be revoked for a sentence to be run consecutively 
to a term imposed for a parole violation. If, as in most cases, parole is 
not revoked until after a new sentence is imposed, and even though the 
sentencing judge may have specified that the sentence was to be served 
consecutively to the parole violation sentence, the DOC treats the new 
sentence as starting on the date of its imposition and thus is either an 
"underlapping" sentence or an "overlapping concurrent/consecutive" 
sentence. 
123 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 567, added a prohibition to MD. ANN. CODE art. 
27, § 700(k) which prevents a parole violator from receiving the benefit 
of credits earned prior to release on parole. This provision could not be 
applied to either prisoner without violation of ex post facto principles. 
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h. Getting" Wickes' ed" 
Representatives from the DOC testified before the 
Maryland General Assembly that the cell parole theory of 
sentence calculation was too cumbersome and unfair in its 
application. Moreover, the DOC also testified that it was 
incapable of recalculating all those sentences in regard to 
the double good conduct credits. However, the DOC's 
reaction to Wickes was to recalculate all ofthe prisoners 
sentences. For those individuals who had been released 
based upon a overlapping consecutive/concurrent 
sentence calculation but which would not have been 
released at that time under a cell parole sentence 
calculation, the DOC issued administrative escape 
warrants124 for approximately 160 prisoners. 125 
3. Henderson 
Vincent Henderson was released from the DOC to 
MSRonJuly7, 1997.126 On May 5, 1998, after 10 months 
of infraction :free mandatory supervision release, Henderson 
was "Wickes' ed" under the authority of an administrative 
retake warrant charging escape. 127 After retaining 
Henderson in custody for several days, Henderson was 
released on May 14, 1998 pursuant to habeas corpus 
relief granted by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on 
the grounds that the DOC had violated Henderson's due 
process rights. 128 Some short time after Henderson was 
released, the DOC released those other prisoners which 
had been "Wickes'ed" back into custody, but still 
maintained that the DOC had acted properly in retaking 
124 These were not judicially issued arrest warrants, but rather 
administrative escape retake warrants issued by the Parole Commission. 
12.1 Administrative escape retake warrants were issued for III individuals, 
and an additional 13 warrants were issued for individuals who had been 
erroneously released but also had parole violations pending. 
126 See Henderson, 351 Md. 43S, 447, 71S A.2d. 1150, 1155 (199S). 
127 See id. at 447-4S, 71S A.2d. at 1155. Approximately 50 individuals 
were physically returned to the DOC pursuant to an administrative 
escape retake warrant. 
128 See id. at 449, 71S A.2d at 1156. 
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the prisoners. 129 On May 18, 1998, the DOC appealed 
the decision to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
and at the same time petitioned the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland for issuance of a writ of certiorari. 130 The court 
granted the petition and the matter proceeded on an 
expedited basis with arguments held only three weeks later 
on June 6, 1998.131 
The case was of obvious importance to Henderson, 
but the system-wide impact was more significant. The 
DOC was forced to finally admit that their twist on the 
Wickes decision impacted some 2000 prisoners and thus 
resolving the difficulties created for that large prisoner 
population was imperative.132 
On appeal, the DOC took the position that its post-
Wickes policies were a correction of its prior erroneous 
construction of Article 27, section 700, which had been 
corrected by Wickes. 133 The DOC further argued that 
Henderson's due process rights were not violated because 
129 See id. at 450, 71S at 1156. At oral argument before the court of 
appeals on Henderson, the court was prompted to ask the DOC, if the 
court of appeals ruled in their favor, would the DOC retake all effected 
prisoners, hold themjust long enough for them to lose their employment, 
housing, and means of transportation, and then release them. 
130 See id. 
131 Henderson argued for affirmation of the trial court on ex post facto 
principles of state and federal constitutional grounds and his counsel, 
Ralph S. Tyler, formerly Deputy Attorney General of Maryland and 
now a partner in the Baltimore office of Hogan & Hartson, LLC, 
vehemently objected to PRISM's entry into the case as amicus curiae 
on behalf ofthe general prison population. Tyler was concerned that the 
general prison population's arguments could adversely affect or detract 
from his argument on behalf of his one client. 
PRISM took the position that the problem, while systematic, 
was not constitutional in nature. PRISM recognized the sweeping effect 
the DOC's interpretation had on the prison population and the systemic 
interests in resolving the issue for the entire prison popUlation to avoid 
delay and overcrowding ofthe court docket. The court of appeals agreed 
and permitted PRISM to brief and argue as amicus curiae on behalf of 
the prisoners on several grounds, including the need to amend Wickes. 
In rendering its decision in Wickes, the court of appeals 
understandably did not appreciate how the dicta in that case would be 
used by the DOC to make mischief. The court ultimately adopted the 
prison«rs' position and revised the Wickes decision rather than reaching 
any constitutional issues, thus resoiving not only Henderson's problem, 
but the dilemma that faced all similarly situated prisoners. 
132 See supra note lOS. 
133 See Henderson, 351 Md. at 451, 71S A.2d. at 1156. 
the DOC's policy pursuant to Wickes was a foreseeable 
result and he was not required to serve any more time 
than required under the law. 134 
Henderson argued that the Wickes decision 
constituted a new ruled the DOC's retroactive application 
of Wickes was arbitrary and capricious. I35 Henderson also 
raised two constitutional arguments. First, that the 
retroactive application of Wickes violated the federal and 
state constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, 
and, second, that it violated substantive due process. 136 
As amicus curiae, PRISM argued for the prisoner 
class that the DOC's interpretation of Wickes violated 
federal and state equal protection principles and the clear 
intent of the statute. 137 Accordingly, the court needed to 
clarify its decision in Wickes to ensure that prisoners 
received the full benefit of their earned diminution credits. 138 
Finally, Wickes should be applied retroactively to the 
prisoners benefited by the decision. 139 
Judge Wilner authored the Henderson decision for a 
divided court.140 That decision held that Judge 
Chasanow's decision in Wickes went beyond what was 
necessary to render a decision in that case and it was that 
additional language, argued by the prisoners to be diCta,141 
that had caused the mischief that prompted the Fields 
litigation 
While there was no true mea culpa, the court of 
appeals did acknowledge the misstep of Wickes and 
heeded the amicus curiae IS call to clarify Wickes, bringing 
an end, for now, to the long running credits controversy. 
134 See id. at 447-49,718 A.2d at 1I55. 
m See id. at 448,718 A.2d at 1155. 
136 See id. 
137 See Amicus curiae brief for PRISM at 9, Henderson (No. 39-1998). 
138 See id. at 20. 
139 See id. at 24. 
140 The opinion was written by Wilner, J., andjoined by Eldridge, Raker 
and Cathell, JJ. Chasanow, J., author of Frost, Fields and Wickes, filed 
a heated dissent and was joined by Bell, C.J., and Rodowsky, 1. 
141 During oral argument there was a respectful but spirited debate 
between prisoners' counsel and Judge Chasanow as to whether or not 
that language was in fact dicta. Judge Chasanow maintained at oral 
argument and later in his dissent that the language did indeed set forth the 
law of the case. 
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In so doing, the court concluded that the rule of lenity 
alone would have dictated the same result in Wickes and 
Fields without any need to go further. 142 Additionally, 
had the ruling been confined to those instances where strict 
application of the section 700 definition of "term of 
confinement" deprived some inmates of the benefit of the 
1992 law, there would have been no confusion. 143 But, 
no. The court entered a ruling that envinicated a broader 
definition of "term of confinement" which does not 
aggregate sentences imposed before and after mandatory 
supervision release. The court held that "[t]he sole basis 
of the Division's recalculation of Henderson's good 
conduct credits was the language we used in Wickes ... 
That and that alone, is what led the Division to redetermine 
the mandatory supervision release dates of some 2,000 
inmates."142 
The majority recognized that the expanded holding 
of Wickes resulting in a restricted application of Article 
27, section 700, "was not necessary in order to reach the 
result in Wickes. "143 The court clarified the rule regarding 
aggregation, stating, "[a ]pplication of the statutory direction 
to aggregated the sentences produces no ambiguity in this 
instance; it does not deprive Mr. Henderson or others 
similarly situated of any legislatively created benefit."I44 
Most significant in the majority opinion was the court's 
recognition of the nuances inherent in Maryland' s diminution 
of confinement scheme. Concluding the court's opinion, 
Judge Wilner opined: 
These three cases -- Fields, Wickes, and 
Henderson -- illustrate the different ways in 
which a statute such as Ch. 588 can affect 
inmates in our correctional system. In Fields 
and Wickes, we were dealing with one context 
and did not need, or really intend, to go beyond 
it. In articulating a secondary justification for 
our holding in Wickes, we inadvertently led the 
Division to a conclusion that was both 
unintended and erroneous. Fields and Wickes 
remain good law, based on the ambiguity 
created in the circumstances of those cases and 
142 See Henderson, 351 Md. at 451-52,7.18 A.2d at 1157. 
143 See id. at 452,718 A.2d at 1157. 
144 [d. at 451,718 A.2d at 1157. 
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its resolution through application of the rule of 
lenity. That rule does not require a departure 
from the statutory direction in § 700 when, as 
here, there is no ambiguity .145 
In Fields and Wickes, the court adopted unanimous 
positions. When it came to Henderson and the 
interpretation of Wickes, the court divided 4-3. The 
stinging tone of the minority decision illustrates just how 
seriously divided the court was on this question. 
The majority's opinion is consistent with 
Fields and Wickes in its explanation of the 
history of § 700 and the interpretation of that 
statute as applied in Fields and Wickes. The 
majority strains to manufacture a way to make 
the Fields and Wickes decisions inapplicable 
to recidivists who commit violent crimes on 
parole in order to let those violent recidivists 
out earlier than our express language in the 
Wickes decision would allow. I do not believe 
this inconsistent construction that benefits 
violent multiple offenders was the intent of the 
legislature, and I know it is contrary to the 
express language of Wickes and was neither 
the intent of the author of the Fields and Wickes 
opinions nor at least two additional members 
of the Court. 146 
III. CONCLUSION 
Prisoners' litigation is not a pursuit which carries 
public favor, especially in regard to matters concerning 
early release from incarceration. It is popular to say that, 
"If a person is sentenced to five years, he should serve 
five years." But that is not really the issue in the series of 
cases which have been discussed in this article. Even the 
most ardent proponent of incarceration would not agree 
that, "If a person is sentenced to five years, he should 
serve seven years." 
145 [d. 
146 [d. at 452,718 A.2d at 1157, (The reader should also note, that while 
not explicitly stating the same, the Henderson Court found the language 
which was at issue in Wickes to indeed be dicta.) 
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The Rule ofLenity is a long standing general principle 
oflaw by which any discretion in imposition or calculation 
of sentence is resolved in favor of the prisoner. For some 
reason, the DOC moved away from that rule a few years 
ago, and began the policies which have resulted in the 
litigation which is the subject of this article. 147 The 
prisoners have described the DOC's conduct in this regard 
as the Rule of Dislenity, whereby any discrepancy in 
sentence calculation is resolved to the prisoners' detriment. 
So far the Rule of Lenity has prevailed,148 although in the 
guise of esoteric and arcane statutory interpretation. Most 
assuredly there will be legislation which addresses the effect 
of this series of decisions. That legislation will most 
probably be aimed at closing a loophole and eliminating 
any discrepancy which might invoke the Rule of Lenity. 
The reader may judge for themselves what course the 
DOC and the prisoners will pursue at that time. 149 
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147 [d. at 453, 718 A.2d at 1158. 
148 [d. at 455-56,718 A.2d at 1159 (Chasanow, J. dissenting). 
149 This move occurred roughly contemporaneously with the revelation 
that John Thanos may have been released prior to his correctly calculated 
release date. The reader will note that Thanos was executed for murders 
which occurred after his actual release, but prior to what could be argued 
to be his correctly calculated release date. 
150 Additionally, while Fields, Sayko, Hood, and Wickes were victories 
for the prisoner, Henderson may fairly be called only a retrospective 
victory. 
151 Currently pending before the Court of Appeals is Lomax v. Warden, 
No. 45, Sept. Term 1998, in which prisoners are challenging the 
Governor's policy of no parole for parolable life sentences. 
